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TRAVEL BAN

Ninth Circuit Protects Refugees with Assurances of Sponsorship
By Peter Margulies

Friday, September 8, 2017, 4:10 PM

The Ninth Circuit held in a per curiam order on Thursday (summarized here) that, pending a de nitive adjudication on the merits, refugees
abroad with sponsorship assurances from U.S. resettlement agencies were not covered by President Trump’s revised executive order (EO) on
refugees and could enter the U.S. in the normal course of refugee resettlement. That’s the right result, though it pushes the boundaries of
the Supreme Court’s June stay order and the Court’s July clari cation, which I wrote about at the time. It also raises some troubling
questions about judicial review of Trump administration actions.
Under the Court’s decision in Nken v. Holder, there are four elements that a party (here, the government) must show to receive a stay:
1. A “strong showing” of likelihood of success on the merits;
2. Irreparable injury;
3. The absence of harm to other interested parties; and
4. Consistency with the public interest.
Remember that before the July order, the government was seeking a stay from a district court injunction that narrowed the revised EO. That
injunction applied the Supreme Court’s holding in its June stay order: non-citizens abroad would not be covered by the EO if they could
show a “bona de relationship” with a U.S. person or entity. Interpreting the Supreme Court’s “bona de relationship” test, the district court
held that the test was satis ed by:
1. A relationship with a U.S. relative, including not just a spouse, parent, or child, but also a grandparent, grandchild, ancé, sibling, inlaw, aunt/uncle, niece/nephew, and cousin; or
2. Sponsorship by a U.S. refugee agency.
In its preliminary decision in July, the Supreme Court let the rst component stand (as did the Ninth Circuit on Thursday). But it ruled,
pending a full review of the stay in the Ninth Circuit, that the second component—refugee agency sponsorship—did not meet the “bona de
relationship” test. Departing from the Supreme Court’s ruling, the Ninth Circuit held on Thursday that refugee agency sponsorship does
qualify as a bona de relationship.
Thursday’s per curiam found that, in light of the vulnerabilities of refugees and the need for continuity in refugee resettlement, the
government did not meet elements (3) (harm to other interested parties) and (4) (the public interest) of the stay test. Sponsorship assurance
by an experienced refugee agency occurs near the end of an elaborate framework of refugee processing that includes reviews by both United
Nations and the U.S. government, including DHS. As the Ninth Circuit explained, the assurances that U.S. resettlement agencies provide
entail the careful marshaling of resources, including the time and money required to stand up a network of U.S. caregivers who will ease the
refugees’ transition in the United States. A pause in refugee admissions would disrupt that painstaking process and fray connections that
agencies labor to establish. Moreover, the U.S. as a country bene ts from its well-earned reputation as a haven for refugees. A pause would
injure that reputation, harming the public interest. Viewed in this light, the Ninth Circuit was right to exempt sponsored refugees from the
revised EO, pending the Supreme Court’s review of the EO’s merits (the Court is set to hear argument on October 10).
However, on the merits, as I explain in a recent piece, the revised EO narrowly passes muster under both the Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA) and the Constitution. The Supreme Court’s June per curiam stay order suggested that equities tend to be less compelling for a
noncitizen abroad who “lacks any connection to this country.” That observation dovetails with the Court’s holding in United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez that constitutional safeguards are few and far between for this group (at least if they’re not detained by the U.S. at
Guantanamo and are therefore entitled to habeas corpus per the Court’s decision in Boumediene v. Bush).
Moreover, the President also has delegated power under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) to suspend the entry of noncitizens on a nding that such entry
would be “detrimental to the interests of the United States.” The revised EO provided for a 120-day pause in the admission of refugees and a
90-day pause in admission of nationals of six countries (Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen) that were either sites of tumultuous
armed con icts or state sponsors of terrorism. That pause would allow for a “worldwide review” to ensure the accuracy of U.S. screening
processes.

As suggested by a Supreme Court case decided in June, Maslenjak v. United States, concerns about the accuracy of screening processes are not
inherently illegitimate, no matter who occupies the White House. In Maslenjak, the Court held that the government had to show that a false
statement made in the course of a noncitizen’s naturalization was “material” to obtaining citizenship—i.e., that the false statement made a
difference in the naturalization decision. In the course of holding that materiality was required, the Court discussed the false statement in
the case, made by a refugee who had claimed that her husband had been subject to persecution in Bosnia. Her husband had in fact served in
a Serbian unit responsible for unspeakable atrocities. While Justice Kagan’s opinion did not de nitively comment on the legal status of this
false statement, the opinion left the strong impression that the statement was both egregiously false and material. A recent study by the
Government Accountability Of ce (GAO) demonstrated that such fraud is sadly not an isolated occurrence. As a longtime immigration
lawyer, I’m well aware of the problem that the GAO report documented: asylum and refugee processing hinges on the statements of
applicants, and those applicants are human beings who sometimes surrender to the temptation to deceive others. As the Maslenjak case
demonstrates, asylum adjudicators do not always spot such attempts at deception. Con ating perpetrators and victims of persecution is, in
the words of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f), “detrimental to the interests of the United States.”
A brief pause tailored to facilitate a worldwide review of refugee and visa screening is consistent with the INA and the Constitution. While I
don’t favor such a pause as a matter of policy, judicial review does not turn on policy preferences. The Supreme Court’s June per curiam stay
order noted that “preserving national security is an urgent objective of the highest order,” and that executive efforts to meet that
“compelling need” were entitled to a measure of judicial deference. As Jack explained in an insightful post, while President Trump’s excesses
have created marked stresses in American governance, responding with an unduly hasty retreat from time-honored principles of deference
can compound the problem. (See Josh Blackman’s post here.) Viewed in this light, while I support the Ninth Circuit’s equitable compassion
for refugees, the overall direction of the Ninth Circuit’s decision may augur a wrong turn in judicial review. Perhaps the Supreme Court will
restore the balance.
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